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Preserving Life
Gerald Kelly, S.J.
Professor of Moral Theology
St. M ary's College
St. Marys, Kansas
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Editor's note: Father Gerald K elly. S.J .. has covered the Catholic
attitude regarding the ordinary means of preserving life and the extraordinary measures necessary to prolong existence in the Medico-MoralProblems series of booklets published by The Catholic Hospital A s.<ociation. These publications ace now in the process of complete revision
and we have asked permission to print, in advance, the following a a
combined article foe LINACRE QUARTERLY readers. Inquiries continue
to reach us regarding these topics and a reprint will be prepared for
distribution at the Federation Exhibit during the A .M .A . convention
. this June. Questions pertinen_t to these subjects were the most frequently asked during the session last year.
THE ORDINARY MEANS OF
PRESERVI NG LIFE

Euthanasia usually implies the
use of some positive means to end
life: e.g., taking poison, a lethal
dose of some drug. and so forth.
But death can a lso be brought
about in a negative way: i.e., by
not taking or giving something
which is necessary for sustaining
life; and in some cases this failure
to take or give what is necessary
for preserving life is equivalently
euthanasia. That is the general
meaning of n. 22 of The Ethical
and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals published by The
<;:atholic Hospital Association:
" The failure to supply the ordinary means of preserving life is
equivalent to euthanasia." A complete explanation of this directive
calls for an explanation of ordinary
and extraordinary means of preserving life, as theologians use
2

these terms, and also for an explanation of the duties of patients
and doctors regarding the use of
these means.
MEANING OF TERMS

Doctors and theologians are apt
to attach different meanings to the
terms, "ordinary'' and "extraordinary," as J. E. Drew, M.D., a nd
John C. Ford, S .J., pointed out in
their article, "Advising Radical
Surgery: A Problem in Medical
Morality," Journal of the American
M edical Association, Feb. 28, 1953,
pp. 711-716. Thus, as rega rds
physicians, Dr. Drew and Fr. Ford
write: "To the physician ordinary
signifies standard, recognized, orthodox, or established medicines or
procedures of that time period. at
that level of medical practice, and
within the limits of availability.
Extraordinary signifies, from the
physician's standpoint. a medicaFEBRUARY, 1957

ment or procedure that might be
fanciful. bizarre, experimental, incompletely established, unorthodox, or not recognized ."
Theologians use these terms in a
different sense; and it is important
to note this because the directive
follows the theological meanin g.
As regards various hospital procedures. the theologian would say
that ordinary means of preserving
life are all medicines, treatments,
and operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which can be obta ined
and used without excessive expense. pain, or other inconvenience.
For example, suppose that a patient whose health is normally
good has pneumonia. This patien t
is now facing a crisis ; but from our
experience we have every reason
to believe that we can bring him
through the crisis by means of certain drugs. such as penicillin, and
the use of oxygen for a time. Once
he passed the crisis he would be
well on the way to complete recovery. Here we seem clearly to
be dealing with ordinary means;
for the use of the drugs and oxygen in these circumstances does
not involve excessive inconvenience; and there is a very reasonable hope of success.
In contradistinction to ordinary
are extraordinary means of preserving life. By these we mean all
medicines, treatments, and operations, which cannot be obtained or
used without excessive expense.
pain, or other inconvenience, or
Which, if used. would not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit. For
example, consider a case like this.
A young woman has a rare cardiac
P!!.BRUARY,
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ailment. There is a chance of curing her with an extremelv delicate
operation; but it is only ~ chance.
Without the operation, she may
die on the table or shortly afterwards: but she also has a chance,
though considerably less than an
even chance, of surviving and of
being at least comparatively cured.
This operation seems to be a clear
example of an extraordinary means
of preserving life, especially because of the risk and uncertainty
that it involves.
Another example. A patient, al~
most 90 years of age. has a cardiorenal disease and has been in a
coma for two weeks, during w hich
time he has received intravenous
solution of glucose and some digi- .
talis preparation. This coma is apparently terminal. In such a case,
is the continued use of glucose and
digitalis to be considered an ordinary or extraordinary means of
preserving life? The answer may
not be entirely clear and beyond
debate; but I believe that moralists
would generally say that. though
the use of the glucose and digitalis
would be ordinary means if it were
merely a matter of tiding a patient
over a temporary crisis, yet in the
present case the actual benefit they
confer on the patient is so slight
in comparison with the continued
cost and difficulty of hospitalization and care that their use should
be called an extraordinary means
of preserving life.
THE DUTY

E very individual has the obligation to take the ordinary means of
preserving his life. Deliberate neglect of such means is tantamount
3

to suicide. Consequently. every
patient has the duty to submit to
any treatment which is clearly an
ordinary means; and his doctor, as
well as the nurses and hospital
personnel, has the duty to use such
means in treating the patient. To
do less than this is equivalently
euthanasia - as is stated in directive 22.
It should be noted, however, that
the di rective is here enunciating
only a minimum: this is the least
that must be done for any patient.
As a matter of fact. there are some
cases in whic h a p a tient might be
obliged to use ext raordinary
means; and there are many cases
in which the doctor is obliged to
use them. In the next section I
shall try to indicate some norms
for the use of extraordinary means
in the care of patients. For the
present. it seems sufficient merely
to state the fact that the use of
extraordinary means is sometimes
obligatory.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is not always easy to distinguish between ordinary a nd extraordinary means of preserving life.
I believe that the definitions I have
given would meet with substantial
approval by most moralists today;
yet some might prefer to phrase
them somewhat differently. For instance, one outstanding theologian
·suggests that ordinary means
would include "the medicines,
nursing, etc., usually adopted b y
persons of the same condition of
life as the patient." This is perhaps a good working rule for most
cases. I believe, h<;>wever, that it
4

should be considered as me rely
supplementary to the definitions I
have given, because my definitions
more explicitly include elements
that are essential to the historical
development of the terms. ordinary
and extraordinary means of p reserving life. The medical pro fession should know something o f this
history.
·
The moralists w ho coined the
terms , ordinary and extraord inary
means of preserving life. w ere
deeply conscious ( as Catholic moralist have a lways been ) of a clear
distinction between the d uty of
avoiding evil and the duty of d oing
good. One must. at all costs. avoid
doing what is intrinsically evil; but
there are reasonable and proportiona te limits to one's duty of doing good. For example, the martyrs were not ordinarily obliged to
seek out their persecutors in order
to profess their faith before them;
but when faced with the critical
choice of either denying their faith
or dying they w ere obliged to submit to death. The reason is that
to deny one's faith in the one true
God is intrinsically evil - something which may never be done.
even to avoid torture and death.
A modern exa mple illustrating the
same matter might be the problem
of childbearing in marriage. Married people are not obliged to have
all the children they possibly can.
nor obliged to have children in the
face of great inconveniences; but
they are clearly obliged to avoid
contraception because it is intrinsically evil.
With this distinction between
doing good and avoiding evil in
LINAC RE QUARTERLY

mind, the old moralists approached
the problem of preserving life.

They were not disturbed by the
problem of "mercy killing"; they
know that ·suicide a nd murder are
always wrong and that no inconveniences can justify them. But to
preserve one's life is to do good :
and the duty of doing good is usually circumscribed by certain limits.
The moralists set out to make a
prude nt estimate of the limits of
this duty. In other words, they
wanted to answer the simple question that any good man might ask:
"How much does God demand
that I do in order to preserve this
life which belongs to God and of
which I am only a steward ?" In
answering this question, they discussed such practical. concrete
things as expense. pain, repugnance, and other inconveniences.
. I NCONVENIEN CE

For example, regarding expense.
they considered it obvious that a
man would have to go to some expense in caring for his health. Yet
he need not spend money or incur
a debt which would impose a very
great hardship on himself or his
family, because this kind of hardip would be more than a " reanable" or "moderate" care of
Ith and therefore more than
God would ordinarily demand.
And· so of other things . The
moralists spoke of great pain. e.g ..
e enduring of a serious operation
days when there were no effective anaesthetics. It took heroism
lo undergo such an ordeal; and the
moralists prudently estimated that
individual would not ordin arily
obliged to submit to it. They
l!BRUARY, 1957

spoke of other inconveniences, too :
e.g .. of moving to another climate
or another country to preserve
one's life. For people whose lives
were, so to speak, · rooted in the
land, and who e native tow n or
village was as dear as life itself.
and for whom , moreover, travel
was always difficult and often dangerous - for such people. moving
to a n other country or climate was
a truly great hardship. and more
than God would demand as a "reasonable" means of preserving one's
health a nd life.
The foregoing are merely exam pies of the way the older mora lists considered the means of preserving life in terms of inconvenience. If the inconven ience involved
in preserving life was excessive by
reason of expense, pain, or other
hard ship to oneself or others. then
this particular means o f preserving
life w as called extraordinary. On
the other hand , when no excessive·
inconvenience was involved, ·the
mea ns of preserving life would
generally be considered ordinary.
U SEFULNESS

There is one more point to be
discussed before I can give a complete idea of the historical notions
of ordinary and extraordinary. I
can illustrate this point by an example taken from another section
of moral theology: the duty of
charity towards one's n eighbor.
Suppose that I see my neighbor
drowning. but that I am a very
poor swimmer and shou ld have
very little chance of saving him.
Am I obliged to make the attempt?
Catholic moralists would say that I
might be heroic to try. but that I

5

would have no strict obligation to
do so. In giving s uch an answer,
they are simply applying a sound
principle of both philosophy and
common sense, na mely. that no one
is obliged to do w11a t is practically
useless.
Moralists have applied this same
principle when discussing the duty
of preserving one's own life, especially by taking medicines, undergoing operations, a nd so forth. As
a matter of fact, we know that
some of these things help. and
some do not; some offer great hope
of s uccess; others offer very slight
hope. The old moralists realized
this too; and they introduced this
element of "hope of success" into
their concepts of ordinary and extraordinary means of preserving
life. A means was considered extraordinary if it involved excessive
inconvenience or if it offered no
reasonabl e hope of benefit. A
means was considered ordinary if
it did not involve excessive inconvenience and it offered a reasonable hope of benefit.
The foregoing are the main
points that mark the development
of the moralists' discussion of ordinary and extraordinary means of
preserving life. We can apply
them to the vast number of artificial life-sustainers now at the disposal of the medical profession by
judging two elements, convenience
.and utility. A medicine, treatment,
etc., is to be considered an ordinary means if it can be obtained
and used with relative convenience and if it offers reasonable
hope of benefit. When either of
these conditions is lacking. the
means is extraordinary.
6

It should also be noted that the
moralists were primarily concerned
with the duty of the individual
( i.e., the patient) , not his doctor.
They thus chose the easier course,
because the doctor's problem is
much more complicated. The patient is obliged to use ordmary
means; as for extraordinary mea ns.
he may use them if he wishes. but,
apart from very special circumstances. he is not obliged to do so.
I have heard it said that the doctor's duty is exactly the same as
the patient's. This is not correct.
The doctor ( as well as nurses and
hospital authorities and personnel)
must do not only what the patient
is obliged to do but also wha t the
patient reasonably wants and what
the recognized standards of the
medical profession r equire. I shall
discuss these points in the next
section.
It is important to nqte that.
though the notions of ordinary and
extraordinary remain the same.
their applications can vary with
changing circumstances. For ex•
ample. major operations used to
be considered extraordinary means
of preserving life on two counts:
first. because the pain was practk•
ally unbearable for most people;
and secondly. because the outcome
was often very uncertain, e.g .. be·
cause of the danger of infection.
Today we have means of controll•
ing both the pain and the danger
of infection; hence, many opera·
tions that would have been eXtra•
ordinary in former times have now
become ordinary means of preserv•
ing life.
LINACRE QUARTERLY

EXTRAORDINARY MEANS OF
PROLONGING LIFE

In the preceding section it was
pointed out that, in terms of modern medical procedures, extraordinary means of preserving l:fc are
all medicines, treatments, ,mJ operations, which cannot be o'.Jtained
or used without excessive ,:xpense.
pain, or other inconvenieP.•:~ for the
patient or for others. or wf.ic h. if
used, would not offer a reasonable
hope of benefit to the patient. One
example given was that of a very
dangerous and uncert.iin opera tion ;
another was the use of such things
as intravenous feeding to prolong
life in a terminal coma. StiJI a nother example. culled from medical literature, is the case "when life
can be somewhat prolonged by a
gastroenterostomy or an enteroanastomosis," as mentioned by
Walter C. Alvar~z. M.D .. in the
Journal of the American Medical
Association, Septemher I.I. 1952.

of receivtng the Last Sacraments.
Here I want to consider the duty
of the doctor to use extraordinary
means of preserv ing )jfe. Under
the term " doc or," I include not
only the attencling physician but
a lso all who assist him in the care
of the patient, i.e., nurses and hospital personnel. To avoid unnecessary complications we shall limit
the discussion to patients who are
in some sense "paying" patients,
i.e .. those whose expenses are being paid by themselves, their rela- .
tives. an insurance company. etc.
In other words. we are excluding
the purely charity case in which
the medical care is given gratis.
THE PATIENT'S WISH

How is the doctor to judge
w hether he is obliged to use an
extraordinary means? The first
rule for judging is indicated by Dr.
Alvarez w hen he speab of some-.
wh;,t prolonging life by a gastrop. 91.
enterostomy or an enteroanastomoIn concrete cases it is no t a lways sis : "the wishes of the patient
easy to determine when a given should be ascertained." The words
frocedure is an extrao r ,Jinary I have italicized contain the first
means. It is not computed accord- rule concerning the doctor's duty :
Ing to a mathematical f•·rmula. but he must do what the patient wishes.
according to the reason..~le judg- It is the patient who has the right
ent of prudent and cor.scientious to use or to refuse the extraordien. Granted such ,, judgment, nary means; hence, it is primarily
e patient himself is not generally the patient who must be consulted.
Clbliged to use or to submit to the Obviously there are many cases in
procedure. He may. with a good which it is impossible tQ consult
conscience, ref-tse it except in spe- the patient, e.g., when he is deliri, I cases w hen a prcolongation of ous or in a coma, or when he is a
s life is necessary: (a) for the small child. In these cases the right
common good, as mif,ht happen in to make the decision is vested in
he case of a great soldier or states- those w ho are closest to the pan; and ( b) for h is own eternal
tient, i.e .. husband. wife, parents.
•elfare, a s might b£ the case when guardians. Thus, Dr. Alvarez
e has not yet had the opportunity rightly says that the wishes of the
EBRUARY, 1957
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family must be consul)ed when
there is question of effor(s at resuscitation by means of oxygen and
"endless injections of stimulants"
in the case of an old person who is
close to death. I might add here
that the rela tives · do not make this
decision precisely in their own
name, but rather as representing
the patient; hence, they should try
to determine what he would reasonably want done under the circu msta nces. ( P erhaps some further distinction should be made regarding relatives and guardians
who merely a dminister the property of the sick man and those w ho
pay his medical bills out of their
own money; but I believe su.ch a
distinction is not pertinent to our
present discussion. )
There a re cases, no doubt, when
consultation with the patient or the
relatives \vould be impossible. or
inadvisable, or useless: e.g., when
they would not understand the issues or are too much distraught to
make decisions, and so forth. In
such cases, it seems to me, the doctor should follow the plan previously suggested for the relatives:
that is, try to make a prudent estimate of what the patient would
reasonably want if he could be
asked. This would mea n that the
doctor would do what he sincerely
judged to be for the best interests
of his patient. If other means a re
lacking for determining this, the
·golden rule should be helpful.
What would the doctor himself
want if he were in the patient's
condition?
STRICT PROFESSIONAL STANDARD
Thus far we have considered
only the doctor-patient relation-
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ship; and what has been said may
be reduced to this: the doctor
should follow the expressed w ishes
of the patient or his representa. tives; and when their wishes cannot be explicitly ascertained , he
should do what he thinks the patient would want or w hat he sincerely judges to be for the ·p atie nt's
best interests. Even these rela tively simple rules are sometimes d ifficult to apply; but the problem of
using or not using ·extraordinary
means may be even further complicated by the question of " professional standards."
When I speak of professional
standards, I mean this: is there
a line of conduct dictated by his
profession itself which requires the
doctor to take means of prolonging
life that might not be required
merely by the physician- patient relationship? To make this problem
more concrete, let me say tha t in
discussions with conscientious physicians I have observed two different professional standards in this
matter.
One group of these conscientious physicians believes that the
doctor's duty is to preserve life as
long as he can, by any means at
his disposal, and no matter how
hopeless the case seems to be. We
can call this the strict, or extreme,
professional standard. The doctors
who uphold this standard admit
the right of the patient or his rep_resentatives to refuse extraordinary means; but they think that.
insofar as the judgment is left to
the doctor himself. he must simply
keep trying to prolong life right
to the very end.
The fo1lowing of this strict
LINACRE QUARTERLY

standard has several advantages.
In the first place, it gives euthanasia the widest berth possible. Secondly, it completely avoids defeatism. These doctors not only keep
trying to conquer a disease. they
also keep trying to save the individual patient. And there is no
doubt about it: they can sometimes show us cases in which a
former patient is now alive and
well two, three, or many years after he was supposed to be "hopeless." Finally, strict though it is,
this standard is easiest on the doctor's own conscience because he is
never forced to make the painful
decision to cease using intravenous
feeding, oxygen, and so forth , in
the case of a dying patient.
IVIODERATE STANDARD

euthanasi ; yet their failure to take
certain means of prolonging life
might at times create the impression of favoring euthanasia. They
a re not defeatists ; yet, through
their willingness to consider some
cases hopeless according to present
medical knowledge, they might occasiona1ly lose a battle that the
stricter doctors would win. lVIoreover , their occasional decisions to
discontinue stimulants or artificial
feeding are seldom ma de with perfect mental peace. Such a decision .
easily generates worry.
But it must be admitted that the
moderate standard is not without
its advantages. For one thing, it
seems to be very much in accord
with the traditional policy of Catholic theologians of interpreting obliga tions according to a reasonable
limit - as we have seen, for exa mple, in their explanation of the
individual's duty of caring for his .
own health.

As I said, there are many conscientious doctors w ho follow the
strict standard to which reference
has just been made. But there a re
others, equa1ly conscientious, w ho
The moderate s tandard also
believe that a more moderate seems to square with a good Chrisstandard should be followed. These tian a ttitude. I once asked the
~octors try to effect a cure as long mother superior of a home for inls there is any reasonable h ope of curable cancer patients whether
doing so; they try to preserve life they used such things as intravenas long as the patient himself can ous feeding to prolong life. She reap any tangible benefits from the plied that they did not. They gave
olonga tion. But they also think a ll patients devoted nursing care;
ere is a point when such efforts they tried to a 1leviate pain; a nd
come futile gestures; and they they helped the patients to make
lieve · that at this point the sole the best possible spiritual preparauty of the doctor is to see that
tion for death. lVIany very good
e patient gets good nursing care people w ith w hom I have spoken
d that his pain is alleviated.
about this matter think these sisters
The advantages of the strict have the right idea - "the good
ndard are the disadva ntages of Christian attitude toward life and
e moderate standard. The doedeath," as they ca11 it. This is
rs who follow this latter standard really an exemplification of the
ainly have no sympathy for moderate standard.
l!BRUARY, 1957
9

Finally, it seems evide that the
moderate standard is Jess likely to
impose excessive burdens on the
patient's relatives. Relatives often
endure terrific strain and undergo
great expense w hile life is being
prolonged by a rtificial means; and
in some cases - e.g., the termina l
coma - very little good seems to
be accomplished. The moderate
standard spares them some of this
strain and expense.
CONCLUSION

have dwelt at some length on
these two views of conscientious
physicians because I wanted to
make it clear that as yet there is
no clear-cut professional standard
regarding what I might respectfully call "the fine points" of care
of the dying. I may add that
among moral theologians a somew hat similar condition prevails:
up to a certain point duties are
clear and there is agreement on
w hat must be done; beyond that
point the rules of obligation become obscure a nd there is room
for differences of opinion.
Some time ago, I published in
the Jesuit quarterly. Theological
Studies (June 1950, pp. 203-220).
a rather lengthy article entitled
" The Duty of Using Artificial
Means of Preserving Life." The
purpose of this article was to stimulate discussion among theologians
. concerning what seemed to be a
cardinal problem in modern medical practice. Later, in the same
magazine ( December, 1951, pp.
550-556), I published a shorter
article entitled " The Duty to Preser ve Life," which included the
points that had been brought out
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in our discussions. This second 1rticle conclu·ded w ith a statement
which substantially expresses the
minds of many competent theologians. Perhaps it will help to reprint it here. It runs as follows .
I. It is not contrary to the comrnon
good for a doctor to admit that a patient
is incurable and to cease trying to effect
a cure. But it would be contrary to the
common good to cease trying to fi nd a
remedy for the disease itself.
2. As long as there is even a slight
hope of curing a patient or checking the
progress of his illness, the doctor should
use ever_y probable remedy at his command. The common good demands this
rule of conduct for the doctor; and it
should be followed as long as the patient
makes no objection. The patient, how·
ever, is entitled to refuse any trea tment
that would be extraordinary.
3. When a doctor and his consultdnl5
have sincerely judged that '! patient is
incurable, the decision concerning further
treatment should be in terms of the patient's own interests and reasonable w ishes,
expressed or implied. Proper treatment
certainly includes the use of all natural
means of preserving life (food, drink,
etc.) , good nursing care, appropriate measures to relieve physical and mental pain,
a nd the opportunity of preparing for
death. Since the professional standards
of conscientious physicians vary some.what regarding the use of further means,
such as artificial life-sustainers, the doctor
should feel free in conscience to use or
not use these things, according to the
circumstances of each. case. In general. it
may be said that he has no moral obliga·
tion to use them unless they offer the hope
of some real benefit to his patient without
imposing a dispropo rtionate inconvenience
on others, or unless, by reason of special
conditions, failure to use such means
would refiect unfavorably on his profession.

All of us who sponsored this
statement realize that it may need
improvement and further clarifica·
tion. Even as it stands, however,
it should help doctors to solve
these difficult cases with a realization of a certain degree of liberty
of judgment and with a consequent
peace of conscience.
LINAC RE QUARTERLY
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,,,
Edward D. Roche, C.M.
C haplain
De Paul Hosp ita l, St. Louis, Mo.
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HE VERBAL switch in the
title is not a little trick made
just to be facetious. It states a
real problem which needs a realistic solution. I am hoping by the
title not only to catch y our eye, but
also to hold your mind and encourage you to look into your conscience.
The traditional call for a doctor
indicates a need; a need at once
urgent and immediate, dema nding
the special care of a medical ma n.
Here, too, is a call also indicating
a need - a need which is also
pressing. demanding the special
care of a dedicated man. This is
the doctor's own family calling ...
calling him to come home, because
of the desperate need of a husband and a father, It can be a
very pitifu_l. sometimes tragic, plea
- "We need a father in the
house!"
This is not a simple problem for
which there is any easy solution.
This is not a question of " close
the shop and go on home," or
"don't delay in the tavern after
Work," or "cut down on the business trips and stop entertaining
the clients at night." Nor am I
c~ncerned with the type of man
who could, but just doesn't want
FEBRUARY,
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to be home, one who is looking for
excuses to stay away. I am talking about a man who is good, honest and sincere, one who loves his
wife and children and wants to be
with them. He feels the lack of
time he has with them as keenly
as they do. But he is a doctor and
he just can't seem to get home because there are too many other
people consuming his time.
Obviously, then, the doctor is
faced with a basic conflict of obliga tions. This is not just an apparent conflict. It is real. because
the two-fold obligation of the doctor is serious a nd binding in cons cience. He has an obligation to
his family w hich he assumed freely and willingly when he received
the sacrament of matrimony. More than just providing food , clothing
and education, he owes himself as
the head of the house, giving love
and affection and assistance to his
wife in caring for and training the
children. H e cannot do this and
be absent from them the greater
part of the time.
H e also has an obligation by
reason of his profession to his patients. He is a doctor, again, because he freely and willingly chose
a medical career. When he be-
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